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TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: CREATING DOMESTIC NORMS THROUGH 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION 
by 
MAUREEN E. WILSON 
(Under the Direction of Emilia Justyna Powell) 
ABSTRACT 
The Republic of Turkey is the most controversial candidate state for European Union 
membership to date.  Not only does Turkey face obstacles with the technical aspects of the 
enlargement process such as changes in domestic policies, the legal system, and economy, but 
the proposed accession of Turkey to the European Union exposes a divergence in norms, values 
and state identity.  The process of international socialization is one explanation for the domestic 
changes occurring in Turkey as part of European Union membership negotiations.  Through the 
lens of the constructivist-rationalist debate in international relations, this study examines how 
changes in domestic norms are imposed on a target state by an international actor, eventually 
leading to changes in state behavior and identity.  Secularism and the status of women in Turkey 
are utilized as examples that demonstrate both similarities and differences in the normative 
values of Turkey and the European Union.  This study concludes with a discussion of the 
credibility of the European Union‟s offer of membership and its impact on the international 
socialization process occurring in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: MODERN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
From its inception or at least after its early success the European Union has continually 
expanded to include more and more states.  What began as a club of six states in the mid-
twentieth century is now 27 states strong and the largest economic bloc in the world.  The most 
recent and historical enlargement of the European Union occurred in the spring of 2004 with the 
addition of ten new member states to what was a union of fifteen nations.  These ten new 
member states consisted of former Eastern Bloc countries, former Soviet Republics, and two 
island nations all geographically, culturally, and politically diverse.  As more and more European 
states are seeking European Union membership for a variety of economic and political 
motivations, the European Union must cope as a whole and as individual states with the many 
issues that surround integration.  The Republic of Turkey is the most controversial and 
problematic state to apply for European Union membership to date. 
 Enlargement is a critical policy area for the EU because as more states integrate the 
balance of power within the Union will shift.  The absorption of new states will cause significant 
policy changes in such areas as economics, agriculture, and foreign and security policy.  Power 
within the Union is balanced between different institutions such as the European Commission, 
the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament.  As new states are brought into the Union 
these institutions and their respective bureaucracies grow and the balance of power within the 
institutions will shift.  For example, the seat distribution in the European Parliament is based on 
the populations of each member state.  Table 1.1 shows the current seat distribution in the 
European Parliament.  Member states with larger populations have more seats in the Parliament.  
If Turkey were to gain membership in the European Union it would have a greater percentage of 
seats in the Parliament since it would have one of the most populous member states with over 76 
 9 
 
million citizens.  This would also mean that Turkey would have a larger voice within the 
European Parliament and could cause tension with other member states.  Thus, the integration of 
new states into the Union affects the internal balance of power and therefore would give heavily 
populated states like Turkey greater influence on Union policy.   
 The proposed accession of Turkey is extremely problematic for a variety of political, 
legal and economic reasons all of which could pose as impediments to membership.  Human 
rights issues have been a great obstacle for the Turkish accession process.  The norms associated 
with respect for human rights and the identity of the Turkish state are posing as another 
roadblock to Turkey‟s goal of attaining EU membership.  The concept of human rights is 
generally accepted to be the inalienable rights of human beings regardless of ethnicity, 
nationality or sex; essentially rights that exist for all human beings simply because they are 
human.  The right to life, standards of living, self determination, and freedom from mistreatment 
and torture are some examples of basic human rights.  Prior to Turkey being acknowledged as a 
candidate state, the European Union expressed great concerns regarding the state of human rights 
in Turkey and its implications on Turkish membership in the Union.  The requirement that 
Turkey adopt EU standards and norms on human rights in order for full membership to be 
extended is a major obstacle to be overcome in Turkey‟s quest for accession.  Although human 
rights practices within the state of Turkey have been an issue in regards to membership 
negotiations, the larger issue is the difference in cultural norms regarding some of these human 
rights practices between EU member states and Turkey that are much more difficult to change. 
 Although the Turkish government is secular as are the governments of the EU member 
states, the Turkish population as a whole still derives many of its values from traditional Islamic 
beliefs.  The paradox then becomes that although the political reality of the Turkish government 
is one based on the separation of religion from state matters, the government has not been able to 
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disassociate itself from the values of Muslim society and tradition.  The creation of Turkey as a 
secular state in 1923 thus has great significance in the context of EU accession.  European Union 
member states are all secular and the populations they contain are majority Christian.  Although 
Turkey is also a secular state, the values of Islamic culture are ingrained in Turkish society (just 
as they are in Christian societies) thus perpetuating many practices that conflict with EU 
standards and norms. 
 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is generally accepted as the founder of the modern Turkish state.  
Known as “the Father Turk,” Ataturk established a modern state adopting the politics, 
economics, and social aspects of Western civilization upon the shattered theocratic Ottoman 
Empire.  Ataturk‟s ideology and basis of his reforms to the Turkish state was known as the Six 
Arrows of Kemalism and included: republicanism, nationalism, populism, reformism, statism, 
and secularism.  Each of these “Arrows” is included in the Turkish constitution.  The concept of 
secularism is the most significant in regard to Turkey‟s relationship with the European Union.  
The democratic ideals of Western European nations become the model for the political elites of 
Turkey who identify themselves as culturally European.  Ataturk thus created the new Turkey as 
a secular state, excluding religion (Islam) from playing an official role in state activities.  He 
eliminated the power of the caliphate ending relations between Islam and the state (Library of 
Congress, 1995).  The aim of the Kemalist conception of secularism seems to have been 
extended to the autonomy of the individual in society.  The ongoing human rights violations in 
Turkey contradicts Ataturk‟s model of society which makes the goal of Turkish accession to the 
EU problematic.   
History of EU-Turkey Relations 
Turkish relations with Europe, the West, and the European Union have a long history.  
The first step towards integration with Western nations was the signing of the North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organization (NATO) on February 18, 1952 (NATO.int).  Turkey has long sought full 
EU membership but has been repeatedly rejected because it fails to meet both political and 
economic criteria for membership.  Thus far the European Union is the only European 
organization to which the Republic of Turkey has been denied member status.  Membership 
negotiations to enter the EU first began in 1963 when Turkey and the European Economic 
Community, the precursor to the European Union, entered into an Association Agreement.  The 
Association Agreement, also known as the Ankara Agreement, focused on economic 
development and the establishment of a customs union in three phases.
1
  The 1963 Ankara 
Agreement essentially established Turkey as an associated member of the EEC and the Turkish 
government understood this as the first step towards full membership.  It was not until 1987 
however, that Turkey first applied for full membership.  The European Commission rejected 
Turkey‟s application citing political and economic obstacles.  It was at this point that Turkey 
decided to pursue completely the customs union first outlined in the Ankara Association 
Agreement.  The customs union was finalized in 1995 and came into effect in 1996.  The 
agreement included the elimination of all duties and charges on imported goods from the 
European Union (Akinci, 2004).   
 Although the European Union has repeatedly confirmed that Turkey is an eligible 
candidate for accession, membership negotiations have been continuously delayed.  In December 
1999 the Helsinki European Council Summit affirmed that Turkey was in fact a contender for 
full membership in the Union.  The conclusion however, was that Turkey still had a long road 
ahead of them with many obstacles to overcome and that the state would benefit from  “pre-
                                                          
1
 The three phases of the Ankara Agreement included:  
1) Preparatory Stage: prepares Turkey to assume later obligations by strengthening the Turkish economy 
and introduces the advantages for Turkish exports to the European Community 
2) Transitional Stage: provide Turkish economy with a new framework to help stimulate economic 
activity 
3) Customs Union: came into effect 1 January 1996.   
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accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms…with particular reference to human 
rights” (Conclusions of the European Council on Turkey Since Luxembourg, 1997).  Since 
membership negotiations were first initiated the state of human rights in Turkey has been and 
continues to be a matter of concern for the European Union.   
 The question of Turkish accession has been discussed at every subsequent European 
Council Summit since 1999.  A major breakthrough occurred for Turkish membership 
negotiations at the 2002 Copenhagen Council.  During this meeting the Council declared that “if 
the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from 
the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the European 
Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay” (European Union 
Commission, 2004).  The Copenhagen Criteria is the standard that all applicant countries must 
demonstrate before accession negotiations begin.  This standard was established at the 1993 
European Council Summit in Copenhagen and clearly states that the following conditions must 
be satisfied by candidate states: 
…the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities… Membership 
presupposes the candidate‟s ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Republic of Turkey 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). 
 
The fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria is challenging for any potential member state.  The 
Republic of Turkey has to make many internal adjustments in terms of their economy, political 
institutions, and legal system all of which contribute to the stability of a democratic society.  
These adjustments occur over many years and Turkey has been working to demonstrate that they 
have accomplished the preliminary requirements.  In December 2004 the European Union 
concluded that Turkey had met these requirements and began accession negotiations in October 
2005.  The proposal of membership negotiations however, is not a promise of full accession; it is 
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an invitation to begin the accession process.  Even though the EU believes Turkey to have met 
preliminary membership requirements, this is only the beginning of many domestic policy 
reforms Turkey will need to make.  Of all the political and economic criteria established by the 
Copenhagen Criteria, the issues surrounding human rights remain a major obstacle to Turkish 
accession.   
 The following chapters will describe the process in which the European Union seeks to 
socialize potential member states in order to change both behavior and identity.  The theory of 
international socialization is explained through the rationalist-constructivist debate.  The process 
of norm internalization and the mechanisms employed by the European Union in the 
enlargement process also contribute to the explanation of creating domestic norms.  The theory 
behind international socialization will then be illustrated by tracing the internalization of the 
norm of secularism and its significance in regard to EU-Turkey relations.  The status of women 
in Turkey and the issue of violence against women in relation to Islamic cultural norms will also 
provide insight into the socialization process.  This study will conclude with an examination of 
credible commitments, the current status of the negotiation process and future implications of the 
situation between Turkey and the European Union.   
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Seat Distribution by Member State in the European Parliament (2009-2014) 
Austria 17 Latvia 8 
Belgium 22 Lithuania 12 
Bulgaria 17 Luxembourg 6 
Cyprus 6 Malta 5 
Czech Republic 22 Netherlands 25 
Denmark 13 Poland 50 
Estonia 6 Portugal 22 
Finland 13 Romania 33 
France 72 Slovakia 13 
Germany 99 Slovenia 7 
Greece 22 Spain 50 
Hungary 22 Sweden 18 
Ireland 12 United Kingdom 72 
Italy 72 Total 736 
Table 1.1                Source: European Parliament (Duch Guillot) 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION 
The emergence of regional and international organizations over the past century has 
profoundly affected relations between states.  As regional and international organizations 
become more common, the power and influence they exert over member states increases.  This 
influence is especially powerful on states that strive for organization membership.  International 
and regional actors often impose specific rules of behavior on non-member states as a means of 
matching state level policies with those of the regional or international actor.  These 
organizations want member states to share the same norms, values, and behaviors, further 
consolidating their power and influence.  As international actors become increasingly influential 
on the state level, it becomes pertinent to explore the conditions and mechanisms in which 
domestic policies and norms are shaped to converge with those of the larger institution.  This 
process in which “states are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of an international 
community” is known as international socialization.   
 This process is currently no where better exemplified than in the case of the European 
Union and Turkey.  The prospect of European Union membership has acted as a catalyst for 
positive developments in many of its new member states.
2
  The proposed accession of Turkey to 
the European Union has been problematic to say the least.  Not only does the Republic of Turkey 
face all of the general economic and political obstacles of applicant states, but there are several 
added dimensions to the question of Turkish membership in the European Union.  The question 
of whether Turkey is a “European” state comes into play.  The major struggle in the proposed 
membership of Turkey in the European Union boils down to a question of identity.  The notion 
that states, just as humans, have an identity is one of the main assumptions of the constructivist 
                                                          
2
 The twelve newest member states to join the European Union are: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia (2004), and Bulgaria and Romania (2007).   
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school of thought.  Through the theoretical framework of international socialization and the 
debate between rationalist and constructivist approaches, I will analyze the successes and failures 
of the European Union‟s attempt to socialize the Republic of Turkey as part of accession process.     
 As the international system becomes increasingly interdependent, regional integration 
continues to both widen and deepen.  States choose to join and cooperate with regional 
organizations for both material and intangible benefits.  Material benefits may include economic 
aid and special trade partnerships, and non-material benefits include status and legitimacy in the 
international community.  However, in order for states to obtain these benefits they must meet 
certain criteria set forth by the larger institution.  The prospect of European Union membership 
acts as a catalyst for change in potential member states.  Before the EU can take on new member 
states, they require candidate states to make domestic changes in order to “socialize” them with 
the Union.  Theories of international socialization perceive this process to be between two actors, 
a socialization agency (the European Union) and a target state (Turkey).  The process of 
international socialization examines several factors regarding integration: incentives, costs, 
credibility, legitimacy, identification, and resonance (Schimmelfennig, Engert, & Knobel, 2006).  
Each of these factors influences whether or not the target state will eventually adopt the rules of 
the socialization agency and become a member of the community.   
 The European Union implements two main strategies to socialize potential member 
states: membership conditionality and normative pressure.  Membership conditionality as a 
political strategy offers candidate states rewards for meeting criteria set by the EU, and generally 
implies changes in legal, economic, and institutional systems.  However, legislation does not 
guarantee changes in norms and values.  As a result the European Union also implements a 
strategy of normative pressure to bring about desired changes in candidate states.  Normative 
pressure seeks to change social norms and in turn identity (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006).  These 
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two strategies can be examined as part of the international socialization process and both the 
rationalist and constructivist approaches offer insight into the divergence of norms in Turkey and 
the socialization process of attaining European Union membership.   
Turkey and the European Union: The Rationalist Perspective 
The rationalist perspective of international relations is characterized by the strategic 
action of states.  According to Alexander Wendt, “rationalists are interested in how incentives in 
the environment affect the price of behavior” (1999, 34).  The rationalist approach is 
materialistic and calculates the costs and incentives of socialization with a larger institution, or 
bargaining in other words.  In the case of the European Union and Turkey, certain standards have 
been set that Turkey must adhere to.  The European Union is based on the norms of a liberal 
democracy.  Turkey on the other hand exists as a theoretically secular state, yet the influence of 
the military in government and values associated with Islam run in direct opposition to the norms 
of the European Union.  This occurrence is known as salience, or the “discrepancy between 
„ought‟ and „is‟; that is, the community ethos and political reality” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006, 
22).  This is more problematic for Turkish accession than for previous candidate states because 
Turkey‟s social and cultural norms are vastly different from those of Western states that 
comprise the liberal democracy of the European Union. 
The ultimate outcome of the rationalist approach is behavior change.  According to this 
theory and the strategy of membership conditionality, pressuring the target state to make changes 
in domestic policy will eventually lead to behavior change.  This will allow the target state to 
align with the larger socialization agency and become part of the group or international 
community.  A change in behavior is in a sense superficial.  The target state may change 
behavior not only to gain material benefits, but also for a better image and reputation in the 
international community.  The target states actions follow a “logic of consequence” that assumes 
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states will act rationally to increase power and security (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005).  
According to this logic it may be in the best interest of the target state to change behavior; 
however this type of change does not account for the social norms and values that the 
constructivist approach focuses on.   
 Instead, rationalism examines the technical environment in which socialization will occur 
and views the agency of socialization as hegemonic power rather than an international 
organization or institution (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006).  The rationalist approach removes 
normative values from the socialization process and focuses on factual rules.  For example, a 
rationalist, when examining the situation between the European Union and Turkey would 
examine legislative reforms and policy changes within the Turkish government rather than 
looking to the identity of the Turkish state.  Target states are coerced into adopting the factual 
rules of the socialization agency in order to produce a behavioral change while normative values 
and identity do not change.   
Turkey and the European Union: The Constructivist Approach 
 The constructivist approach to international relations increasingly provides scholars with 
new avenues in which to examine and explain interactions among major players in world 
politics.  Traditional international relations scholarship contends that states are the dominant 
force in world affairs and characterizes interactions between states as based on material power 
and benefits.  Constructivism on the other hand takes into account the social construction of the 
state and how this affects states behaviors with other states.  Constructivism considers individual 
levels of analysis, and takes into account the preferences and values of the individual and how 
this comprises state identity and behavior.  Constructivism operates on two fundamental 
principles.  First, structures of human culture are comprised of shared ideas, values and norms.  
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The second principle contends that these shared ideas, values and norms construct identity 
(Wendt, 1999). 
 Identity plays an important role in international relations according to constructivists as 
identity to a large degree determines preferences that in turn determine behavior.  To say that 
states are comprised of individuals that share a common identity is a broad generalization.  Yet 
the existence of these identities cannot be denied.  It is safe to assume that although American‟s 
values vary on an individual basis, at some level there is a shared sense of norms and values that 
create a common American identity.  The same can be argued for any state.  The constructivist 
approach to international relations emphasizes the role of norms and values.  Norms are defined 
as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity” (Shannon, 
2000, 294).  Norms exist at all levels of analysis (system, state, and individual) 
 The socialization process of new member states into the European Union according to the 
constructivist approach is to “transmit the constitutive normative rules of the international 
community to individual state” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006, 17).  The desired outcome for 
constructivists in the international socialization process is identity change.  This perspective 
contends that once the new norms of the socialization agency take hold in the target state, 
eventually the identity of the target state will change and become more compatible with the 
larger institution.  Similar norms and values within an organization such as the European Union 
make it easier to create common policy for its member states and citizens.  Although norms and 
values vary from state to state within the EU, Turkey brings a new set of challenges to the table.  
EU member state populations are majority Christian, whereas Turkey is a majority Muslim state.  
Although both secular in practice, diverse cultural norms exist within the EU and Turkey 
respectively that are associated with Christianity and Islam.  It will be more difficult for Turkey 
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to embrace the norms and values of the European Union because the two are more divergent in 
terms of geography, history, culture and religion than compared to other member states.   
 The constructivist approach follows the logic of appropriateness, meaning the target 
government will adopt the rules of the socialization agency if persuaded that the rules are 
appropriate.  According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, three factors influence the logic of 
appropriateness and will increase the adoption of rules: legitimacy, identity and resonance 
(2005).  Legitimacy refers to how the target state views the credibility of the socialization 
agency‟s promise.  Target states will also be more willing to adopt rules of the socialization 
agency if they share common norms and values, or a collective identity.  Target states that aspire 
to become part of the socialization agency will be persuaded to adopt that identity (Checkel, 
1999).  Resonance refers to “domestic factors that facilitate or inhibit persuasion” of rule 
adoption (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005, 20).  Factors that facilitate rule adoption may 
include the lack of a rule on a specific issue because it is a new issue.  Identity and resonance 
have a greater impact on norm diffusion.  A target state is more likely to adopt the norms of the 
larger institution if they share a similar identity, or if the norms of the institution have social or 
cultural significance in the target state.  Identity and resonance are problematic factors 
surrounding rule adoption and socialization processes in Turkey‟s EU negotiations. 
 This approach to international socialization focuses on appropriate action to induce 
normative changes in the target state.  Appropriate action relies on normative pressure from 
international actors to make desired changes.  Normative pressure is the exertion of external 
pressures that will cause the target group to change eventually both their beliefs and behaviors, 
further aligning them with the norms of the larger institution (Kelley, 2004).  The international 
actor uses social influence and collective norms to shame or praise the target government in 
hopes of producing the desired changes to domestic policy. 
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Constructivism and Rationalism: Two Complimentary Approaches 
 The strengths and weaknesses of these approaches account for their compatibility.  
Neither rationalist nor constructivist models attempt to make any predictions about the world, 
explaining why they are considered approaches rather than actual theories.  The rationalist model 
fails to interpret fully the roles that norms and identity play in state behavior.  This model 
focuses on strategic bargaining and incentive, and maintains that states will change behavior 
accordingly to gain power and material benefits.  Constructivism fills in the identity and norm 
gap in the rationalist model.  However, this approach neglects power and material incentives that 
are inherent to the state system in international relations.  Each model contains what the other 
lacks, and therefore rationalism and constructivism are complimentary.  Neither model 
effectively explains the international socialization process alone.  They each ask different 
questions regarding socialization in regard to content and mechanisms for achieving goals.  For 
example, rationalist models look at factual rules while constructivists examine normative rules.  
Mechanisms for desired outcomes in the rationalist model are perceived as strategic, or based on 
incentive and coercion.  Constructivists look to appropriate action and persuasion to achieve 
identity change (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006).  Although the means to achieving the outcomes of 
behavior and identity change are different, the relationship between the outcomes is interesting.  
Can identity change and behavior change occur without the other? 
 If behavior change becomes consistent over time, theoretically the norms associated with 
the new behavior become internalized and changes identity (Wendt, 1999).  This is dependent to 
a large degree on the existing norms within a state, which makes Turkey an interesting example 
for this socialization process in regard to human rights norms.  The Turkish government has 
demonstrated changes in behavior regarding human rights.  National image, material incentive 
and the promise of becoming part of the European “club” all contribute to this behavior change.  
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However, the Turkish government is still criticized for its lack of implementation and 
enforcement of new policies regarding human rights.  This is problematic for several reasons.  
The lack of implementation sends a message to the European Union that Turkey may not 
perceive EU threats and promises as serious or credible.  Thus, the EU withholds incentives or 
slows the accession process and is legitimized by Turkey‟s failure to meet accession criteria.  
This cycle slows both the integration process and domestic policy changes.  The lack of 
emphasis on policy implementation and enforcement also delays the norms diffusion process, 
which will prevent norms from being internalized and the target state fully aligning with the 
socialization agency.  Based on the rationalist and constructivist approaches to international 
socialization, the European Union‟s attempt to socialize Turkey in the area of human rights is 
both a success and a failure.   
 The rationalist approach is successful as Turkey demonstrates significant behavioral 
changes which are evidenced in both policy reforms and the reduction of human rights 
violations.  The constructivist approach thus far has failed to produce significant identity change.  
The norms, values and ideas ingrained in a majority Islamic society are more difficult to blend 
with the liberal democratic Christian ideals of the West.  If this socialization process is to be 
successful in Turkey, both Turkey and the European Union will have to make significant 
concessions.  The European Union must consider how necessary norm change is in Turkey, and 
how much the EU can pressure Turkey to change social norms.  This situation presents several 
consequences.  Turkey has adopted several behavioral changes, however if norm diffusion fails 
to take hold and become internalized significant backlash against the European Union could 
occur.  The socialization of Turkey presents one of the European Union‟s greatest challenges 
presently and in the future.  The rationalist and constructivist approaches to international 
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socialization provide insight into this complex issue that will have significant effects regardless 
of the outcome.   
Norm Internalization 
 Both the rationalist and constructivist models seek to explain an outcome of either 
behavioral or identity change and the internalization of norms.  Norms are closely linked to 
identity as any given identity has a prescribed set of norms and values.  These are often 
associated with religious, cultural and political values.  As more states seek not only membership 
in regional and international organizations, but also the respect of the collective international 
community, they are forced to adopt norms divergent of their own. 
 The internalization of a given norm occurs in three states: emergence, cascade and 
internalization (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).  The emergence stage is characterized by norm 
entrepreneurs as the agency for the creation and promotion of new norms.  Norm entrepreneurs 
often utilize organizational platforms as a means to promote a given norm.  These platforms 
could be a nongovernmental organization with a specific agenda or a body such as the United 
Nations or European Union “that have purposes and agendas other than simply promoting one 
specific norm” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 899).  Norm entrepreneurs are critical and can be 
an agency such as a state or an individual leader.  The entrepreneurs promote a given norm to its 
“tipping point” in which the second stage of internalization begins.   
 A norm has reached the tipping point or threshold when enough states have adopted the 
new norm begins to spread.  During the norm cascade stage, states begin to adopt behavioral 
changes associated with the new norm, “states comply with norms to demonstrate that they have 
adapted to the social environment – that they „belong‟” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 903).  The 
desire to be viewed as a legitimate regime in the international community is important for all 
states.  As a result they strive to belong to the group to create a better self-image and reputation.  
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This is part of the normative pressure mechanism, as states want to be seen as legitimate in the 
international community and choose to adopt new norms rather than violate them.  When new 
norms become accepted not only out of self interest but because they are deemed legitimate by 
the target state they have become internalized (the third stage of norm internalization).  The 
internalization of a norm is the point in which identity change occurs in target states.  It is both 
the behavioral and identity change that the international actor or agency seeks when socializing a 
target state.   
 The question then becomes why states choose to accept and adopt norms imposed on 
them from international actors.  Ian Hurd‟s explanation utilizes models of social control that 
include coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy to demonstrate why target states adopt new norms.  
The first mechanism in which states take on new norms is coercion and “refers to a relation of 
asymmetrical physical power among agents, where this asymmetry is applied to changing 
behavior of the weaker agent” (Hurd, 1999, 383).  Essentially, states adopt norms from the 
international actor out of fear of punishment or sanction.  Membership conditionality is a form of 
coercion.  The European Union provides rewards to candidate states for meeting criteria and 
adopting norms and punishes states that do not by withdrawing aid or imposing sanctions.   
 After states are coerced they comply with new rules and norms out of self-interest.  States 
calculate the costs and benefits of rule compliance and make the best decision for the state at that 
time in the given environment.  Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel point out that “the higher 
the material benefits that the international community expects from a target state‟s adoption of 
the community rules… the higher also are the costs that the socialization agency is willing to 
bear to socialize the target state” (2006, 19).  The same reasoning can be applied to the target 
state.  The more the target state seeks to gain from compliance, the more it is willing to comply. 
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 The last reason that states comply with new rules and norms according to Hurd is 
legitimacy.  This coincides with the norm internalization stage.  States adopt and comply with 
imposed rules and norms because they believe them to be legitimate and “compliance is no 
longer motivated by the simple fear of retribution, or by a calculation of self-interest, but instead 
by an internal sense of moral obligation” (Hurd, 1999, 387).  When states accept new rules and 
norms as legitimate, they become internalized, leading to the desired behavior change sought by 
the socialization agent. 
 The example of Turkey and the European Union provides an excellent case study for the 
international socialization and internalization of norms in a target state.  One key normative 
value of the European Union is secularism, or the separation of religion and politics.  The 
existence of an Islamic population and the norms associated with it are a point of contention for 
accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union.  Although the Turkish 
government is secular in practice, the population as a whole still derives many of its values from 
traditional Islamic beliefs.  The paradox then becomes that although the political reality of the 
Turkish government is one based on the separation of religion from state matters, the 
government has not been able to disassociate itself from the values of Muslim society and 
tradition. 
Mechanisms for Change 
 The issue of Turkish integration is highly controversial primarily because Turkey is a 
populous, poor, and majority Muslim state.  Political and economic convergence with the 
European Union therefore is more difficult for Turkey than it has been for other applicant states 
in the past.  The first step in the EU enlargement process is that applicant states demonstrate their 
adherence to the Copenhagen Criteria.  This must be demonstrated in order for preliminary 
negotiations talks to begin.  After initial negotiations have begun, accession partnerships are 
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established.  These agreements outline the domestic policy transformations the EU seeks in the 
target state that have both short and long-term political goals that will help the candidate state to 
converge with the norms and standards of the European Union.  According to Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier a candidate state is more likely to adopt EU rules and standards if they identify 
with and share similar norms and values.  This has been and continues to be the dilemma for the 
EU-Turkey relationship, whether or not the combination of the Turkish government (in which 
the military as a de facto influence) and a majority Muslim population can identify with the 
liberal democratic norms of the European Union.  
 The integration of Turkey into the European Union requires many domestic policy 
transformations specifically in the areas of human rights and minority rights.  Policy 
transformation in Turkey has proven difficult on both the domestic and international levels.  
Turkey has sought EU integration since the 1960s but has remained an outsider while other 
nations achieved accession with a much briefer delay.  The question then becomes how far is 
Turkey willing to go to meet EU standards and norms, and to what extent can the EU push 
Turkey to make enough internal changes to align itself finally with the Union.   
 The relationship between the European Union and Turkey provides an excellent example 
of the role and influence of an international actor on a domestic level.  Many credit the recent 
policy reforms within Turkey to the European Union enlargement process and prospect of 
accession.  After Turkey received recognition as a candidate state on equal footing with other 
potential EU members in 1999, eight legislative reform packages were introduced covering 
issues ranging from the death penalty to the strengthening of gender equality and a new Penal 
Code was adopted in September 2004 (Commission Report 2004).  This international 
socialization process is achieved through two main mechanisms: membership conditionality and 
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normative pressure.  The European Union implements both strategies in order to gain desired 
results from candidate states.    
Membership Conditionality 
 The mechanism of membership conditionality is a political strategy employed by states or 
other international organizations to reward target states performance.  A target state is presented 
with the possibility of membership into an exclusive club or organization, but before 
membership is granted, the target state must perform.  Their reward for performance is 
membership.  If the target state does not perform as the international actor requires they receive 
no reward or no membership.  States are granted membership on the condition that they meet the 
standards and requirements set forth by the international actor.   
 The European Union employs a strategy of membership conditionality to promote 
domestic policy transformation in Turkey.  In this case the socialization agency presents the 
target state with an objective and a reward for meeting the objective.  The target state then has 
several options.  First, they can perform as the socialization agency requires and receive a 
reward.  Rewards in this case can be tangible benefits such as increased aid or a share in the 
internal market of the EU, or intangible such as moving on to the next step in the socialization 
process.  In the case of the European Union and Turkey, moving forward in accession 
negotiations is a reward.  The target state can also choose to not comply with the presented 
objective.  As a result the socialization agency withholds rewards until the target state complies, 
or punishes the target state.  Punishment comes in the form of economic sanctions or public 
embarrassment.  In the strategy of membership conditionality the target state weighs the costs 
and benefits associated with compliance.  States respond to the demands of the socialization 
agency when incentives are presented.  In this case the incentive for Turkey is the long sought 
acceptance into the European community.  If the cost of socialization outweighs the benefits, that 
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target state is less likely to comply.  The target state also considers the credibility of the 
socialization agency‟s offer.  This is an issue with Turkey and the European Union as Turkey has 
been seeking membership for over 40 years.  The continuous stop-and-go process of accession 
negotiations leaves Turkey wondering if the EU if offering true membership or intends for 
Turkey to remain an outsider yet in its sphere of influence. 
Normative Pressure 
 The strategy of normative pressure follows the constructivist model of socialization and 
the logic of appropriateness.  States are induced to make identity changes based on the identity 
and normative values of the socialization agency.  For example, the European Union places an 
emphasis on human rights and gender equality.  The normative values of a very strict Muslim 
society would conflict with those of the European Union regarding the extent to which women 
are allowed to participate in society politically, economically and socially.  Inducing change in 
areas like this is problematic.  A state may introduce new policies regarding equal opportunities 
for women; however it is difficult to change the inherent values of population, especially when 
those values are tied to a religious tradition.   
 When socialization agencies seek changes in normative values in target states, they apply 
normative pressure or social influence to bring about desired changes.  The socialization agency, 
in this case the European Union, uses its collective norms to persuade, shame, or praise the target 
government in hope of producing the desired changes to domestic policy.  Theoretically, 
normative pressure is the exertion of external pressures that will cause the target government to 
change both the beliefs and behaviors, further aligning them with the collective norms of the 
socialization agency (Kelley, 2004).   
 Normative pressure can be used to change both behavior and identity.  The socialization 
agency can apply normative pressure as part of the strategy to induce domestic policy changes in 
 29 
 
the target state.  Once the new policy and norms associated with it have been introduced and the 
norm internalization process takes effect, the outcome should result in both behavior and identity 
changes.   
 The European Union makes it clear that its fundamental ideas of legitimate statehood 
include liberal democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights, and that these norms are 
vital for candidate states to adopt (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005).  The adoption of EU 
rules and norms is a condition and the incentive is membership.  The Union also applies 
normative pressure on candidate states in hopes of producing domestic policy and normative 
changes.  It will be more difficult for Turkey to embrace the norms and values of the European 
Union because the two are more divergent in terms of geography, history, culture, and religion 
than compared to other member states.  The European Union Commission compiles a report and 
recommendation on the progress of candidate states towards accession for the European Council 
and Parliament.  This recommendation helps determine whether or not candidate countries have 
met preliminary conditions required for opening membership negotiations and the Commission 
has established that political criteria such as human rights and minority issues will be considered 
in the admission process.  Since official membership negotiations began in October 2005, the 
Commission believes that preliminary steps to change domestic policy towards human rights 
have been taken.  This policy area however remains a great concern for both the European Union 
and Turkey, as human rights issues could prevent Turkish accession to the Union.    
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNALIZING SECULARISM 
The norm of secularism in Turkey can be traced through Finnemore and Sikkink‟s stages 
of norm internalization beginning with the emergence of secularism in Turkey in the early 20
th
 
century (1998).  Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is an excellent example of a norm entrepreneur.  
Ataturk is generally considered the founder of the modern Turkish Republic.  He established a 
modern state by adopting political, economic, and social aspects of Western Civilization upon 
the shattered theocratic Ottoman Empire. As part of Ataturk‟s reforms to the Turkish state, he 
adopted secularism as part of his Six Arrows of Kemalism
3
.  Secularism and the democratic ideals 
of Western European nations became the model for the political elites of Turkey who identified 
themselves as culturally European.    
 The tipping point for the norm of secularism came much later and was influenced by EU-
Turkish relations.  Turkey has sought membership in the European Community since the 1960‟s 
and did not gain candidate status until 1999 (Erdemli, 2003).  Even after being recognized as a 
candidate for membership, accession negotiations did not begin until 2005.  The tipping point 
and start of the norm cascade began when the European Union presented Turkey with a 
relatively credible offer of membership when Turkey was recognized as a candidate country.  
Prior to this secularism and government institutions in Turkey were unstable due in part to 
military influence in Turkish government. 
Military Influence in Turkish Government 
 Military influence in government affairs has been problematic in the course of EU-
Turkey relations.  The subjugation of the military to politics is endemic to European political 
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 The other Arrow of Kemalism include: republicanism, nationalism, populism, reformism, and statism (Library of 
Congress Country Studies: Turkey, 1995). 
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culture and the accepted norm in member states.  The military has played a significant role in 
Turkish politics as they are viewed as the defenders of the ideals of the Kemalist state and are 
highly pro-secular.  Politics in Turkey on the other hand seem to be subject to military influence.  
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic the military has played an important role in the 
political system.  In 1950 a multiparty political system was established and “tended toward a 
bifocal configuration, with the political parties and their leaders forming one focus and the 
military leadership (plus the state elite) on the other” (Kramer, 2000, 24).  These two sides were 
unable to coexist politically.  On four separate occasions (1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997) the 
military staged coups that proved its predominance in the political arena (Kramer, 2000, 24).  
Each of these undertakings was staged to oust the current governments that the military believed 
to be too dictatorial, too weak, or to rectify political crises of the time.  The most recent coup 
which occurred in 1997 was staged to expel the Islamist government that the military supposed 
to be a threat to the Kemalist state ideal that the military protects and upholds.  Although these 
military interventions in the Turkish government were intended to bring about lasting political 
change and stability, these changes have always been short-lived or never realized.  Each time 
the military attempts to transform the government the multiparty system reemerges.  The military 
remains influential in politics because, as Kramer contends, “civilian politicians seem unable to 
provide long-term political stability and guidance” (2000, 25).  The uncertainty of political 
instability contributes to a society in which civilians are less likely to oppose the authority of the 
military which, unlike other political parties and leaders, has been a constant on the political 
scene.  This disconnect from EU values was one reason for instituting a policy of conditionality, 
to coerce Turkey into aligning itself with European political values.  The divergent values 
regarding the role of military in politics between Turkey and the EU is detrimental to the 
accession process as military influence (specifically interventions) in government create a 
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distancing effect between Turkey and the EU and thus slows the integration process (Unwin, 
1998). 
 Since the last military coup and the commencement of accession negotiations secularism 
and government institutions are more stable.  During this time Turkey has shifted from being 
coerced into compliance with EU norms, to viewing compliance as being in self-interest.  Turkey 
has much to gain from European Union membership and has made a rational choice to accept 
new norms.  It is safe to assume that Turkey views the norm of secularization as legitimate since 
they have been the only majority Muslim state to sustain a secular democracy since 1946 
(Toprak, 2005).  Turkey has demonstrated the behavior change identified by rationalists; this is 
evident in their ability to move forward with accession negotiations.  A change in Turkish 
identity based on European Union norms is yet to be determined as it is difficult to induce an 
identity change so vastly different such as in the case of an Islamic society to Western norms.   
 Turkey presents a unique case for secularization in Muslim countries.  Populations in 
many majority Muslim countries believe that Shari’a (Islamic law) should have some role in 
legislation, if not be the sole source of legislation.  In a May 2007 Gallup poll, 41% of Turks 
interviewed believed that Shari‟a should not be a source of legislation, while 26% said it should 
be one source of legislation (but not the sole source), and only 7% said Shari‟a should be the 
only source of legislation in Turkey (Crabtree, 2007).  This poll demonstrates that compared to 
other Muslim states, Turkey has internalized the norm of secularization.  When comparing 
Turkey to other EU member states and candidate countries however, there has never been a 
question over the role of Shari‟a in political affairs. 
 This can also be examined through public opinion on national institutions.  In another 
May 2007 Gallup poll, Turks were asked what national institutions they had confidence in.  81% 
responded that they had confidence in the military and 69% expressed their confidence in 
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religious institutions.  On the other had the judicial system and national government elicited 67% 
and 56% of citizens‟ confidence respectively (Rheault, 2007).  Confidence in government 
institutions is high, however the role and influence of the military in Turkish political affairs is 
detrimental to the accession process.  The Turkish view of the military in politics runs in direct 
opposition to that of EU member states.  And although Turkey has been able to maintain a 
secular state for some time, several political parties, including the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) stem from political Islam (Rheault, 2007).  The possibility that Islam 
could play a role in politics is greater in Turkey than in EU member states.  However, the same 
argument can be made regarding Christian values in the European Union.  
 Secularization in Turkey is an internalized norm.  This norm emerged before the 
establishment of the European Union; however the prospect of European Union membership has 
contributed to the solidarity and internalization of this norm.  Throughout the accession process, 
the EU has utilized both conditionality and normative pressure as mechanisms of international 
socialization in Turkey.  In regard to long sought EU membership, Turkey finds it not only in its 
self-interest to remain a secular state, but has maintained a secular democracy for some time 
demonstrating the legitimacy of this norm.     
 “Turkey‟s general credentials as a European country are often contested because of its 
distinct Muslim heritage…Although Turkey‟s state doctrine of „Kemalism‟ contains a deep, 
historical commitment to „Westernization‟, it is partially based on values alien to those of 
Western liberal democracy…” contend Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel (2006, 97)  The 
issue regarding secularization and political norms then becomes whether or not the Republic of 
Turkey can maintain a separation of Islam and politics, and what role political Islam will play in 
future politics.  Clearly there are discrepancies in political norms between the European Union 
and Turkey, as evidenced by the role of the Turkish military in government affairs.   
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 The norm of secularism is internalized in Turkish government and society.  And although 
the European Union is a key international socialization agency in Turkey, it did not directly 
establish the norm of secularization in Turkey.  Instead, the political elites of the time and 
presently identify themselves as Western and strive towards Western political ideals.  The 
European Union did play a part in the diffusion of secularism in Turkey when Turkey set a goal 
of eventual European integration.  Although Turkey is somewhat of an anomaly in Muslim 
states, in that it does not believe Shari‟a should play a part in government, the existence of an 
Islamic society with Islamic norms and values cannot be denied.  The European Union is left to 
struggle with questions surrounding the compatibility of Islamic and European identities and 
whether or not the socialization process can be effective and norms can be internalized in a 
system of norms and values profoundly different from those of the European Union. 
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     Figure 3.1        Source: Gallup (Rheault 2007) 
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CHAPTER 4 
TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC GENDER ROLES IN A SECULAR STATE 
The status of women is one human rights issue that the Republic of Turkey is dealing 
with in their bid for European Union membership.  Women‟s rights are one of the largest current 
human rights campaigns.  Amnesty International (2004) describes the fight for women‟s rights as 
“violence against women is rooted in a global culture of discrimination which denies women 
equal rights with men and which legitimizes the appropriation of women‟s bodies for individual 
gratification or political ends.”  Gender based violence is a major risk for women in many areas 
of the world.  Many violations against women are justified by societal, cultural, or religious 
beliefs.  A major example of this is women in Islamic communities.  Women in the Muslim 
world face especially aggressive infringements of their rights and personal sovereignty.  Women 
in Islamic societies and specifically Turkey are confronted with very different issues that not 
only include violence, but a lack of basic freedoms and extreme subjugation by men.   
 The Republic of Turkey has since its establishment set an example for providing equal 
rights for men and women.  With the establishment of the secular state, many discriminatory 
practices of the Ottoman Empire were ended and women were granted political rights in the 
1930s (Ecevit, 2007).  Traditional Islamic practices regarding inheritance, marriage and divorce 
were ended and primary education became mandatory for both boys and girls.  Under the 
leadership of Ataturk, Turkey became a pioneer not only in the Islamic community, but in the 
rest of the world as well.  Throughout the twentieth century, women in Turkey fought hard to 
gain and retain their rights as equal citizens.  In 1930 women received the right to vote and by 
1934 women were able to be elected to political offices (International Women‟s Democracy 
Center).  Table 4.3 show the number of women elected to parliament between 1935 and 2007.  
Although women have had equal rights according to the government for decades, until recently 
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the legal texts of the state have perpetuated a less than equal status for women.  Gender based 
violence remains an issue in Turkey and the government is taking steps to address these issues.  
European Union candidacy has been a catalyst for change in this area; however policy change is 
insufficient on its own.  Enforcement of new policy and legislation is necessary in order for 
behavioral changes to become identity changes.  This chapter will describe the violence against 
women in Turkey and the impact of human rights treaties on improving the status of women in 
the state, specifically the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). 
Gender Based Violence 
 Much of the violence that women face is the result of unequal power relations between 
men and women.  Women in Islamic communities face violence at the hands of those who wield 
power over them such as husbands, fathers, brothers, and other male family members.  Not only 
do these women face brutal violations of their person, but they are also limited in their basic 
functions.  These restrictions are a result of an imbalance in gender equality, and interpretation of 
the Koran and other Islamic texts from which laws are derived.  In the case of Turkey the laws of 
the secular state contradict the Islamic laws that are so deeply ingrained in Turkish society, thus 
creating a disconnect in how society interprets the role of women.  One of the core aims of 
Ataturk‟s Kemalism was to extend the autonomy of the individual in society; however this 
contradicts traditional Islamic gender roles.  Traditionally women in Islam are restricted in the 
extent to which they can participate in society economically, politically, legally, and socially.  
These restrictions limit rather than extend personal autonomy and create another paradox within 
Turkey concerning secular values and Islamic societal values.   
 Women in Turkey face domestic violence, rape, honor killings, prostitution, and 
trafficking.  Domestic violence is by far the most widespread violation of women‟s rights in 
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Turkey and beating is the most common form.  According to a study completed by Istanbul‟s 
Bilgi University in 2003, of 6,440 married and divorced women in 25 provinces surveyed, 31.5 
percent were beaten by their husbands and 21.5 percent were beaten by their fathers.  
Additionally, 41% of these women were subjected to arranged marriages (U.S. State Department 
Report, 2003).  There are laws in place in Turkey, such as the Law for Protection of Family, that 
allow victims of domestic violence to apply to the courts for assistance and protection.  However 
many judges in the courts only issue restraining orders, while other authorities such as the police 
simply advise women to return to their abusive husbands and fathers.  The U.S. State Department 
report on human rights practices in Turkey claims that authorities have effectively enforced court 
restraining orders and other judgments to protect victims of domestic violence.  It is believed 
however, that many abused women do not report violence in their homes because of notions of 
family honor.   
 Rape is another common form of violence that women all over the world face.  Turkish 
law prohibits rape and Islam expresses disapproval of all violence against women.  Like many 
other human rights violations, human rights activists believe that instances of rape are severely 
underreported.  In many states rape is unreported because it is extremely difficult to prosecute 
cases of sexual assault.  Many women are raped by their husbands, and until recently this 
violence was not considered a criminal offense.  The previous Turkish Penal Code provisions 
stated that rape is not a crime committed against an individual, but rather a crime committed 
against society.  Reported cases of sexual violence were classified as “Felonies against Public 
Decency and Family Order” in Turkish law (Women for Women‟s Human Rights).  Often times 
a woman‟s virginity is an element of the crime.  For example, sexual violence that is committed 
against non-virgins is perceived as a less serious offense.  In many cases if the perpetrator 
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marries the victim, there is no punishment.  Societal notions such as honor make it difficult for 
women to come forward after sexual assault.  
In 2004 a new Penal Code was introduced in the Turkish Parliament Grand National 
Assembly.  This new legislation includes over thirty amendments to the old Penal Code that give 
women and girls increased protection and rights regarding gender equality and sexual and bodily 
rights (Women for Women‟s Human Rights).  For example, the new Penal Code has 
criminalized marital rape and crimes of sexual violence are no longer referred to as crimes 
against society, but rather crimes against individuals and crimes against inviolability of sexual 
integrity.  It is changes such as these that can over time adjust societal norms regarding sexual 
violence and women‟s role as the victim rather than a perpetrator in these crimes.  The new Penal 
Code has also removed all references to chastity, honor, public morality, shame, etc.  References 
to notions such as these in the previous Penal Code reinforced societal norms that placed women 
at a disadvantage and threatened the lives of women.  Practices associated with chastity and 
honor such as virginity testing and honor killings remain a problem in Turkey. 
Virginity testing refers to a process in which young girls and women are examined to 
determine if they are sexually active.  The practice is used in cultures in which there is a high 
emphasis on namus, or family honor, specifically the sexual integrity of women in the family 
(Levin 2007, 204).  This practice places women at a disadvantage especially when they are 
victims of gender based violence like rape.  Before the amendments to the Penal Code, the sexual 
status of women was often considered an element of a crime such as rape.  If a victim of rape 
was known to be unchaste then the severity of the crime is lessened.  Virginity tests at one time 
were also used as part of the recruiting process for hiring personnel for state offices in Turkey 
(Ecevit, 2007).  In 1998 virginity tests were banned in Turkey after five school aged girls 
attempted to commit suicide pending forcible virginity tests (BBC News, 2002).  Although the 
 40 
 
practice has been banned by the Turkish government, women can still request a virginity test.  
These tests may be requested if a woman has been the victim of sexual violence and requires 
evidence of the crime.  Since the ban on virginity testing the US State Department reports a 
decrease in reports of virginity testing in Turkey and in 2003 no reports of virginity tests were 
made (US State Department Report). 
Honor killings remain a problem in Turkey, especially in the Southeast and East regions 
of the state where large Kurdish populations that hold very traditional Islamic beliefs and 
practices exist.  Honor killings are also linked to notions of family honor and sexual purity.  
These killings and brutal violations of women‟s and human rights are often carried out by male 
family members if a daughter, sister, wife, etc. has been deemed shameful to the family.  Women 
do not have any say in these decisions on their lives.  Killings are often carried out if a woman 
has been found or accused of being unchaste, pregnant out of wedlock, committing adultery, or 
refusing an arranged marriage.  Just as with other violent crimes committed against women, it is 
often underreported and it is difficult to estimate the true number of victims of honor killings.  
The Turkish government reported however, 1,806 honor killings between 2001 and 2006.  New 
legislation has been introduced that increases the penalties for perpetrators of these crimes.  
Those convicted of honor killings receive a penalty of a life sentence in prison.  The US State 
Department reports that since there are sentence reductions for juvenile offenders, often times 
families delegate carrying out honor killings to younger members of the family (US State 
Department Report, 2008).  As a result of the increased penalties for honor killings, another 
problem has arisen.   
Communities and families that practice honor killings are now pressuring girls and 
women to commit suicide rather than a family member risk imprisonment for the act.  High 
suicide rates among girls in the Southeast and East provinces of Turkey have risen more than 
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50% since 1993 (US State Department Report, 2000).  The government also reported 5,375 
suicides among women in the period 2001-2006 (US State Department Report, 2006).  The 
practice of honor killings is part of upholding social norms in some areas.  In 2005, Dicle 
University surveyed 430 people (78% men) on honor killings.  37.4% of respondents felt that 
honor killings were justified by adultery, while 21.6% of respondents said that infidelity justified 
violence such as cutting off the nose or ears of the adulterous wife (US State Department Report, 
2006).            
 Practices associated with the values of Islamic society contradict those of the secular 
state creating an extremely difficult situation for women.  The correlation between women‟s 
sexuality and family honor reinforces a society in which violence against women is an accepted 
norm.  Although the Turkish government has been a pioneer for Muslim states in regard to 
equality for women and women‟s rights, family values and structure remain highly patriarchal.       
 Women‟s rights in Islam are so highly sensitive because it involves deeply held religious 
and cultural values.  Riffat Hassan, professor of religious studies at the University of Louisville, 
summarizes the effect of Islamic cultural and religious values on the status of women: “the way 
Islam has been practiced in most Muslim societies for centuries has left millions of Muslim 
women with battered bodies, minds, and souls” (Orens, 2003).  The status of women in Turkey is 
a result of deeply held religious beliefs and cultural norms that are hard to change despite the 
contradicting values of the secular states and the influence of the European Union.  
Turkey and CEDAW 
 Despite the continuing struggles regarding violence against women, the Turkish 
government has taken significant steps to improve the status of women in the state.  One such 
step is signing and ratifying Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW).  This treaty on women‟s rights was entered into force in 1981 and 
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Turkey ratified CEDAW in 1985 (Levin, 2007).  Article 28 of the Convention allows states to 
ratify with reservations provided that the state reservations are not “incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the present Convention” (CEDAW Article 28).  The Turkish government ratified 
the treaty with reservations on Articles 15, 16, and 29.
4
  Article 15 and 16 deal with the legal 
status of women, and marriage and family life.  Turkey placed reservations on these articles 
citing that these articles were not “completely compatible with the provisions of the Turkish 
Civil Code” (CEDAW Reservations).    Article 29 of the Convention stipulates that disputes 
arising between states party to the Convention may be submitted to the ICJ.  Turkey placed a 
reservation on this article on the basis that Article 29 also states that states may declare that they 
are not bound by the first part of the article.   
 In September 1999 Turkey declared that it would withdraw some of the reservations they 
initially placed on the Convention.  The reservations on Articles 15 and 16 were withdrawn, and 
the reservation on Article 29 regarding the ICJ remained.  This was an important step for 
women‟s rights in Turkey.  Although Turkey had been party to the Convention since its 
inception, the state did not make changes the domestic system until the late 1990s.  It was during 
                                                          
4
 The following are the specific parts of CEDAW that Turkey made reservations on: 
Article 15 – Paragraph 2: States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of 
men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal rights to 
conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and 
tribunals. 
Article 15 – Paragraph 4:  States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law 
relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile. 
Article 16 – Paragraph 1: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of 
men and women: (c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; (d) The same rights 
and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the 
interests of the children shall be paramount; (f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, 
wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national 
legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; (g) The same personal rights as husband and 
wife, including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation; (CEDAW Reservations) 
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this time that Turkey also began to fully pursue European Union membership.  Since 1999 
Turkey has made significant legal reforms to demonstrate its dedication to improving the status 
of women.  Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution describes equality of citizens before the law, 
and stipulates that no discrimination may occur on the basis of sex.  Although this article does 
deem that men and women are equal in the eyes of the law, in May 2004 an amendment was 
made adding a paragraph giving more emphasis on the equality of women and men.  The 
additional to Article 10 reads: “Men and women have equal rights.  The State shall have the 
obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice” (Turkish Constitution). 
 Another significant constitutional amendment was passed in 2004 regarding international 
treaties.  Article 90 was amended and now states that in regard to international agreements 
dealing with “fundamental rights and freedoms,” or human rights, if a conflict arises between 
domestic policy and the agreement then the provisions of the treaty shall supersede domestic 
law.  Essentially, all human rights treaties have precedent over Turkish domestic law.  This 
amendment is one way that Turkey is able to demonstrate to the international community and the 
European Union that it not only takes human rights issues seriously, but that it is willing to allow 
international agreements to prevail over domestic law in this area.   
 Along with constitutional amendments, the Republic of Turkey has also made changes in 
their civil code, penal code, and introduced new legislation dealing with issues that women 
specifically face.  The Turkish Civil Code was originally adopted in 1926 and had several 
stipulations that placed women at a disadvantage in many areas.  For example, in the old Civil 
Code, the husband was automatically deemed the head of the union, placing the wife in a 
subordinate position.  The new amendments to the Civil Code give both the husband and wife 
equal status in the marriage (Levin, 2007).  Other amendments to the Civil Code that improve 
that status of women include raising the age of marriage for both men and women to over 17 
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years old, women must no longer obtain permission from her husband to seek employment, and 
shared financial responsibility for the household is now adopted (Office of the Prime Minister, 
Directorate General of Press and Information). 
 Changes in the Turkish Penal Code have also been significant in the improvement of the 
status of women in Turkey.  As described above, the new Penal Code has included many 
amendments to protect women‟s rights and criminalize many violent gender based acts.  These 
changes to the domestic laws of Turkey are part of an attempt to change not only behaviors 
regarding human and women‟s rights, but also change the norms associated with these 
violations.  The first step to making domestic changes is to change policies and laws and increase 
enforcement of the new laws.  Over time, the new norms become part of the state identity and the 
occurrence of these crimes will be reduced.  Levin describes these changes as “an attempt to root 
out patriarchal concepts embedded in Turkish society that threaten the well-being of Turkish 
women and girls, such as chastity, honor, and morality” (2007, 210).   
 In 1998 the Law on the Protection of the Family came into force and was the first piece 
of legislation in Turkey that dealt specifically with domestic violence (Levin, 2007).  This law is 
another significant step to improving the status of women in Turkey as domestic violence 
remains a widespread problem.  The Law on the Protection of the Family requires the state to 
take action against the abuser.  The accused can be ordered to end abusive behavior, leave the 
residence, surrender weapons, and not to cause distress to his family among other sanctions.  
Courts may apply these measures for up to six months and if orders are not obeyed, the accused 
may face imprisonment (Women‟s Learning Partnership).  Through this law the state is to 
provide protection for victims of domestic abuse, however if domestic violence is unreported it is 
ineffective.  Table 4.2 shows the number of court cases filed in criminal courts on the basis of the 
Law on the Protection of the Family.  A new initiative to assist victims of domestic violence 
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began in October 2007.  A domestic violence hotline financed by the European Union was 
implemented and received 150 phone calls in the first ten days of operation (US State 
Department Report, 2008).   
 Overall, progress has been made on the status of women in Turkey.  Acceptance in the 
European community and long sought EU membership has been catalyst for making changes.  
Many of legal changes that have been implemented in Turkey occurred in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s as Turkey worked for candidate state status.  Many of the changes regarding human 
rights in Turkey are the result of demonstrating adherence to the Copenhagen Criteria for 
candidate states and meeting the requirements imposed by membership conditionality.  The 
challenge for the future is to not only maintain the policy changes, but to make normative 
changes regarding human rights and specifically women‟s rights.  These normative changes will 
occur over time as new generations of Turks are indoctrinated into the international human rights 
regime.  The European Union fears the implications of integrating new member states that still 
struggle with issues such as honor killings and widespread domestic violence.  Although the 
Turkish government has made significant changes in the domestic legal system, Turkey must 
continue to shift cultural norms to align with the norms of the European Union. 
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Turkey Ratification of International Women’s Rights Treaties 
Treaty Signature Ratification Accession Entry Into 
Force 
Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) 
  20 
December 
1985 
 
Optional Protocol to CEDAW 8 September 
2000 
29 October 
2002 
  
United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized 
Crime 
13 
December 
2000 
25 March 
2003 
 29 
September 
2003 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children
5
 
13 
December 
2000 
25 March 
2003 
 25 
December 
2003 
Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air
6
 
13 
December 
2000 
25 March 
2003 
 28 January 
2004 
Table 4.1       Source: University of Minnesota Human Rights Library 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 This treaty supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime Preamble and 
supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime. 
6
 This treaty also supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
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Number of Court Cases Filed before Criminal Courts on the Basis of the Law on the 
Protection of the Family No. 4320 and the Number of Defendants 
 
Years 
 
No. of 
Court 
Cases 
Filed 
Number of Defendants 
Age 12-15 Age 16-18 Age 19+ Total 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Total 
1999 109 0 0 0 0 122 1 122 1 123 
2000 108 0 0 2 5 108 2 110 7 117 
2001 125 10 0 4 0 115 5 129 5 134 
2002 158 2 0 1 0 160 3 163 3 166 
2003 213 3 0 0 0 218 4 221 4 225 
2004 322 0 0 4 0 319 10 323 10 333 
2005 439 5 0 0 0 447 12 452 12 464 
2006 646 30 6 2 0 685 18 717 24 741 
Table 4.2                    Source: CEDAW Report, 2008, p. 8 
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Percentage of Female Members of Parliament Elected between 1935 and 2007 
Election Year Total  Female Male Female % 
1935 399 18 381 4.5 
1939 424 16 408 3.8 
1943 455 16 439 3.5 
1946 465 9 456 1.9 
1950 487 3 484 0.6 
1954 541 4 537 0.7 
1957 610 8 602 1.3 
1961 450 3 447 0.7 
1965 450 8 442 1.8 
1969 450 5 445 1.1 
1973 450 6 444 1.3 
1977 450 4 446 0.9 
1983 400 12 387 3.0 
1987 450 6 444 1.3 
1991 450 8 442 1.3 
1995 450 13 437 2.9 
1999 550 22 528 4.0 
2002 550 24 526 4.4 
2007 550 50 500 9 
Table 4.3              Source: CEDAW Report, 2008,p. 26 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS 
 The Republic of Turkey faces many obstacles in the process of European integration.  
Human rights issues have been one area in which Turkey has needed to make significant 
improvements.  The Turkish government must also take steps to improve the judicial system, the 
economy, and national security.  Turkey met preliminary standards as set forth by the 
Copenhagen Criteria and in October 2005 the European Union officially opened membership 
negotiations.  Negotiations however, were met with extreme controversy within the Union over a 
variety of issues such as Turkey‟s refusal to recognize the state of Cyprus (a member state of the 
EU).  If membership negotiations are successful, the actual accession of Turkey to the European 
Union could not occur till at least 2014 as determined by the EU budget and financial framework 
for the next budget cycle (EurActiv, 2004).  In the meantime other states such as Bulgaria and 
Romania have gained entry into the European Union and it is possible that the two other 
candidate states (Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) could achieve 
membership before Turkey.  Although Turkey has sought membership in the European Union for 
decades, relatively new states have gained entry quicker and with much less controversy than 
Turkey.  This creates skepticism within Turkey towards the EU, which affects the 
implementation of new policies required for accession. 
 As more states gain entry before Turkey the credibility of the EU‟s enlargement objective 
is called into question.  The continuous rejection of membership has slowed both the integration 
process and domestic policy transformations which legitimizes membership rejection.  This cycle 
questions the European Union‟s true interest in Turkish integration.  The perpetual membership 
rejection followed by membership negotiations that are repeatedly stopped is perceived as the 
Union‟s attempt to keep Turkey out of the EU yet still in its sphere of influence.  One 
 50 
 
perspective on this relationship is that the failure of the Turkish state to make necessary reforms 
on domestic policy is a direct result of the lack of credibility of the EU‟s offer of membership.  
On the other hand, the inaction of the European Union is legitimized by the Turkish 
government‟s failure to make necessary policy reforms (Arikan, 2003).  This cycle is part of 
Turkey weighing the costs and benefits of making domestic changes.  If the Turkish government 
does not perceive the commitments of the European Union as credible, then the costs of making 
changes outweigh the benefits.  Candidate states are advised to make changes in specific areas in 
order bring domestic policy and law in line with that of the European Union.   
 The European Union outlines all the policy areas and laws for candidate states to adopt in 
the acquis communautaire which is the entire body EU law.  The acquis is divided into chapters 
based on issue area such as taxation, education and social policy.  Each area is negotiated 
between the Union and the candidate state and the candidate state must adhere to the acquis.  
Once chapters are opened they may be “frozen” based on candidate state performance.  This is 
part of the membership conditionality and bargaining process.  The opening and closing of 
chapters must be unanimous in the European Council, which can be problematic based on 
member state support of Turkish accession.   
Turkey and the EU are negotiating 35 chapters of the acquis and to date one chapter has 
been closed and twelve have been opened.  In December 2006 as a result of Turkey failing to 
comply with part of an agreement regarding Cyprus, the EU froze eight chapters until the 
Turkish government complies (European Union Commission).  The chapters that are currently 
frozen are critical policy areas that include agriculture and rural development, financial services, 
and the free movement of goods.   The process is slow and tedious and some chapters will be 
more difficult to adopt than others.  The Turkish government is also wary of the accession 
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process as the eventual outcome may not be membership.  Candidate state status and 
membership negotiations do not guarantee membership.   
 As membership negotiations continue to start and stop, public support of the European 
Union in Turkey is decreasing.  A fall 2008 Eurobarometer poll demonstrated that Turkish 
citizens that viewed EU membership as a “good thing” has fallen from 49% (spring 2008) to 
42% (2008).  Public support has also dropped regarding the perceived benefits of EU 
membership from 58% (spring 2008) to 48% (Eurobarometer, 2008).  The decrease in public 
support for the European Union could be problematic for both the Union and the Turkish 
government.   
 Overall, Turkey has made considerable improvements as evidenced by the opening of 
accession negotiations.  In order for improvements to continue the European Union needs to 
demonstrate credible commitments to its offer of membership.  The Recommendation of the 
European Council on Turkey‟s progress towards accession concludes that Turkey has made 
significant progress in many areas but that more can be made.  The human rights situation in 
Turkey has improved significantly as a result of European Union influence.  The decision to 
integrate Turkey into the Union is highly controversial and is a complex one.  The Turkish 
government must continue to make improvements in the status of human rights, specifically the 
status of women.  This proves to be difficult because of the complex socio-economic and 
political nature of the Turkish state.  Internal contradictions such as the role of Islam in Turkey 
make the process of Turkish accession more challenging than it has been for other states.  Many 
perceive the rise of Islam in politics as a threat to the West.  The state of human rights is another 
internal contradiction that creates a barrier between Turkey and the EU.  The issue of human 
rights is one area that could potentially prevent EU membership.  Table 5.1 shows the number of 
decisions made on Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights.   
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Conclusions  
This study has examined the process of international socialization through the case study 
of Turkey and the European Union.  The European Union acting as the socialization agency 
promotes specific norms onto the target state of Turkey in order to produce domestic changes.  
The desire of the Turkish government to join the European Union is the environment in which 
this example of the international socialization process takes place.  Perhaps the greatest challenge 
of the process of Turkish accession is difference in normative values and state identity between 
Turkey and the European Union.  The European Union is a group of like-minded states that have 
a common history, religion, and identity.  Part of the Union‟s identity is based in the norms 
associated with liberal democracy and respect for human rights.  Turkey on the other hand is a 
paradox that is struggling with its own identity.  Turkey is situated in a unique geographic 
position between East and West.  The same can be said of the state identity, as it is a secular 
democracy built upon an Islamic theocracy with a majority Muslim population.  And while the 
political elite have always identified with Western states and worked to model the government 
on those of the West, Turkish society must find a middle ground between the cultural norms and 
values of Islam and norms being imposed as a result of relations with the European Union. 
    The process of international socialization was explained through the rationalist and 
constructivist approaches to international relations.  These approaches explain the two desired 
outcomes of the socialization process: behavior and identity change.  As part of the process of 
creating domestic norms in a target state, the norm life cycle explains how norms are diffused 
from a starting point or norm entrepreneur to internalization.  The mechanisms that the European 
Union utilizes in order to socialize target states is also described.  Each of these processes and 
mechanisms are illustrated through specific examples.  The norm of secularism is traced from the 
founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, through the tipping point and to 
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internalization.  This demonstrates Turkey‟s ability to keep Islam separate from government 
which is necessary if it is to achieve membership in the EU.   
 The process of international socialization is further examined through the status of 
women in Turkey.  This example provides excellent insight into the struggle between Islamic 
cultural values and new norms pushed by the Union.  Although Turkey is very liberal compared 
to other states with majority Muslim populations, women are still threatened with domestic and 
gender based violence.  Some of these violations of women‟s rights occur because they are part 
of cultural norms and values.  The example of violence against women in Turkey is used in this 
study because it demonstrates the struggle between tradition and identity change at a very basic 
and real level.   
 Overall Turkey has demonstrated marked improvements in the area of women‟s rights.  
Improvements in the Penal Code and Constitution are part of the government‟s commitment to 
make changes necessary for accession.  Change in domestic policy does not guarantee change in 
normative values.  The Turkish government needs to continue the enforcement of new policies 
regarding human rights and violence against women.  European Union membership and 
international treaties like CEDAW show the state‟s commitment to continuing to improve the 
status of women.  Enforcement must continue for new norms regarding violence against women 
to become internalized.  The international socialization process continues to occur in this area as 
new legislation is adopted and the occurrences of violence against women decreases.  The 
changes in domestic policy produce behavioral change and over time norms will become 
internalized and the change in identity will occur.   
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Number of European Court of Human Rights Cases Decisions on Turkey 
 
Table 5.1                         Source: Duvakli,2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year  Decisions  
1995  3  
1996  5  
1997  8  
1998  18  
1999  19  
2000  39  
2001 218  
2002 99  
2003 123  
2004 171  
2005 290  
2006 300  
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